Professor Bryant holds a B.Com. (Canterbury), a M.Com.(Auckland), a M.A. (Ohio State), a Ph.D. (Cincinnati), and a CA (New Zealand).
He joined the Ivey Business School in 1996. Since 1980 he was a member of the Faculty of Management at the University of Toronto, where he taught extensively in degree and non-degree programs. His teaching and research area is accounting, particularly the area of Strategic Costing for management decision making. He has published articles, monographs and cases in this field, some of which have been international prize winners. In 1996, he received the prestigious OCUFA award, a province-wide teaching award for teaching, program innovation, and program leadership for his work as Director of the Executive MBA program from 1992-1996 at the University of Toronto.
Professor Bryant is currently director of the London and Southwestern region Local Health Integration Network, and the research director for the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Governance of Executive Compensation. He is also active in a number of other organizations, including the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, Domtar, Industry Science Canada, and Unum Corporation. He previously taught at IMI, Ohio State University, University of Cincinnati, University of Auckland (NZ), University of Otago (NZ), University of Manitoba, Johannes Keppler Universitaet (Austria), and LIMAK Internationale Management Akademie (Austria).
Abstract: The collapse of the Icelandic financial system in October 2008, was unprecedented in both scale and scope, 97% of the financial system collapsed, inflation was rampant, the currency disintegrated, and unemployment was both a social and political issue. This paper endeavours to show, using documentary evidence from 2003-2008, whether the system of monitoring of the banks and economy failed - applying evidence of institutional ascription. The contribution of the paper is to document that both institutional ascriptions, along with corruption and greed, were endemic from 2003-2008. The resurrection and recovery followed a transparent process, based upon objectives of wealth equality along with fairness - inclusive capitalism, to address what went wrong, address the overhang of debt and the rebuild of trust in all institutions, including government itself.
Abstract: This paper aims to apply the theory of gatekeeping — institutional ascription — using the financial crisis of 2008–2009 in Iceland as a case. An investigation of the theory was conducted (Gabbioneta et al., 2014). The research question tested is whether the auditors, regulators, rating agencies, and analysts failed in the duty of stewardship to assess the scale and scope of accounting scandals and fraud perpetrated by executives of financial institutions. The paper shows that unless legal cases are prosecuted, where a complete presentation of evidence is presented, the theory has explanatory power but little predictive power, as all information must be in the public domain. The data applied in this paper is enriched by several unique elements of the situation described: a Special Investigation Commission (SIC, 2010), a report by a well-known regulator, the Office of a Special Prosecutor, (Jännäri, 2009) the role of the Supreme Court in reviewing all cases emanating from the crash, and a Report on Financial Stability (Central Bank of Iceland, 2010). Because of the extensive database provided by a combination of disinfectant and sunlight, this paper permits a richness of data across all financial institutions and an investigation of the theory of institutional ascription. The paper teaches authorities the need for more active use of the criminal system to prosecute wrongdoing.
Abstract: The paper addresses a plea by accounting educators that ethics should be integrated into the accounting curriculum (Poje and Zaman Groff 2022). Further, accountants should teach ethics. Case learning is consistent with Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy of six levels of learning. The ethics literature supports using cases to teach ethics because cases allow each student to put themselves in the position of a decision-maker. Case selection should engage the learner emotionally. Therefore, current issues are preferable. With these goals—engaging the student as a learner, ensuring action learning, and meeting the learning taxonomy of Bloom, the paper provides educators with a suggested road map of case materials that can be employed in accounting courses across the program. Road maps are a means to demonstrate a holistic view of curriculum design and learning execution across specific accounting courses.
Abstract: A shareholder derivative suit is an action allowed by the courts available for shareholders who believe that they have been harmed by actions of the board of directors and management. In most instances, particularly in the US state of Delaware, the actions are not allowed to proceed. The rationale being that the business judgment rule applies and as a consequence boards of directors are not held responsible for bad decisions and as a result, the business judgment is held to be supreme. Thus they are presumed to act with diligence, without self-interest and in the best interests of the corporation. In the case of the action against Wells Fargo and Company, Judge Tigar of the Northern District of California, has allowed the action to go ahead, on the basis that the directors had been negligent on multiple actions with respect to several proceedings by Federal Agencies against the bank and furthermore that the directors failed to hold senior management to account when concerns were raised from several sources about malfeasance occurring in the bank. The paper suggests the arguments both for the plaintiffs and the defendants in the case.
Abstract: The primary goal of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect investors by deterring wrongdoing resulting in investor loss. The SEC deters wrongdoing in two ways: by threatening penalties and signalling illegal behaviour. If the SEC does not hold individuals accountable or if it is unclear what actions are illegal, wrongdoing will continue. Consent decrees have become the SEC's enforcement norm. Through negotiation both the defendant and the agency avoid costs and save time, but individuals responsible for wrongdoing have largely avoided personal accountability. Although firms have introduced clawback provisions into executive contracts, evidence shows that boards of directors largely have not activated clawbacks. Boards must hold employees personally responsible; thus boards should design executive contracts that clearly state the rationale for clawbacks and a means by which their amounts - amounts both fair and in the best interests of the corporation - can be established.
Abstract: We describe holding companies and their main roles. We follow up by describing the spectacular development of the investment company, Exista. We then discuss how the difference in fair value methods and equity methods may provide a false picture of the state of companies. This applies especially to different types of holding companies. Our paper shows an example of one that people generally perceived as being a financial company when in reality was more like an investment company, in this case a highly risky and leveraged one.
Abstract: Control systems rely jointly upon the rule of law and firm, system and government level governance processes. When these elements fail, the glue of society, trust, is broken. Consequently, if trust is broken there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of all market participants to rebuild trust. The failure of the financial system in Iceland in 2008 was catastrophic. The failure was systemic and from a public policy perspective, was a story of financial integrity with application beyond Iceland. This paper documents in a coherent manner the various mechanisms that were employed by government its regulatory agencies its judicial processes and the reconstituted banks themselves to rebuild trust. This paper is supplemented by interviews as well as an analysis of the mechanisms adopted, providing key lessons for governance and public policy.
Bryant, M. J., 1999, "Mapleview Hospital", Journal of Accounting Case Research, January 5(1): 88 - 102.
Abstract: The review of the incentive system occurred as a result of the high level of dissatisfaction expressed by most members of the department. As the department consists of highly trained professionals who are directly responsible for revenue generation, the situation is not acceptable. If the issue is not resolved, it is likely that the Group Practice Plan will break apart. The problem is being exacerbated by an environment in which the Medicare fee schedule has remained flat while costs continue to rise. In spite of the relatively generous base compensation package, one of the reasons for dissatisfaction is that most physicians saw their annual bonus decline relative to fiscal 1989. One of the goals in resolving the current situation is to create a compensation system that will remain in place for the foreseeable future.
Abstract: Standard setting in the accounting field is a political process therefore, any theory of accounting must be a positive one, rather than a normative postulate. The normative approach to accounting has been rejected on the grounds that it is impossible to achieve consensus on an appropriate paradigm. A positive theory provides hypotheses capable of empirical verification and furnishes a basis by which to evaluate the economic consequences of accounting standards. The accounting profession is legally bound to use Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) accounting standards recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 delegate authority to the SEC to determine the accounting practices used in the financial reports of corporations subject to those laws. When the FASB proposes a rule, it solicits comments from interested parties. FASB's role is to improve financial reporting with due regard for the problems and needs of preparers and users of financial information, while at the same time being responsive to various pressures, including those from government.
Bryant, M. J.; Sigurjonsson, T. O., (Forthcoming), "Lack of Transparency and Failure of Monitoring Leading to Crisis", International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics
Bryant, M. J.; Johnsen, G.; Magnusson, G.; Sigurjonsson, T. O., (Forthcoming), "Debt Reduction for Economic Resurrection and Redistribution", International Journal of Political Economy
Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) Teaching Award 1996 given for program innovation for the Executive MBA Program at the University of Toronto.
Experience
Assoc. Professor; Ivey Business School, Western University (1998-present)
Assoc. Professor, The Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto (1980-98)
Director, Executive MBA Program, UofT (1991-96)
Associate Dean, MBA Programs, UofT (1993-96)
Discipline Rep., Erindale College (1983-88)
Research/Course Development
Written some 25 cases in Managerial Accounting including: Caribbean Internet Café; Surgeons of Steel; Flawless Tool and Die Manufacturing; Fisher and Paykel Limited; Kookaburra Limited. In health care: Mapleview Hospital; St. Catharines General Hospital; Note on the Ontario Health Care System; Gamma-Dynacare
