Ownership and Competition
We model the trade-offs of an investor who builds positions and exerts governance in competing firms. The implicit cost of doing traditional governance is under-diversification, since her incentives to cut slack and improve efficiency are low when she has similar exposure to all firms in an industry. The benefit is to escape the incentive to push firms to compete less aggressively, and avoid the potential litigation and reputational costs. We study how these trade-offs shape the equilibrium interactions of ownership, governance, and competition, and the role of competition policy in a world where investors influence the objectives of competing firms.
Jan Schneemeier
Jan Schneemeier is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Broad College of Business at Michigan State University. Prior to joining MSU, he was on the faculty at Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business from 2017 to 2024 and served as an economist in the International Finance Division at the Federal Reserve Board from 2015 to 2017. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Economics from the University of Chicago and a Diploma in Business Economics from Goethe University Frankfurt.
Professor Schneemeier’s areas of expertise range from Corporate governance, sustainability, corporate finance, and information economics. His research lies at the intersection of corporate finance and financial intermediation, with recent work presented at leading conferences including the AFA, EFA, SFS Cavalcade, and RCFS Winter Conference. He is a member of the Finance Theory Group and has received recognition for his research, including the 2023 Research Award from the Kelley School of Business.
At MSU, he teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in Investments, and has previously taught Intermediate Corporate Finance at Indiana University. He also contributes to academic service through committee work and active involvement in doctoral training and recruiting.